Abstract-Information flow control models can be applied widely. This paper discusses only the models preventing information leakage during program execution. In the prevention, an informat ion flow control model dynamically monitors statements that will cause information flows and ban statements that may cause leakage. We involved in the research of informat ion flow control for years and identified that sensitive informat ion may be leaked only when it is output. However, most existing models ignore informat ion flows induced by output statements. We thus designed a new model XIFC (X informat ion flow control) that especially emphasizes the monitoring of output statements. We also designed XIFC as a precise and low runtime overhead model. To achieve this purpose, we took a different viewpoint to re-examine the features offered by existing models and extracted a necessary feature set for the design. Our experiments show that XIFC bans every non-secure information flow and substantially reduces runtime overhead when comparing with our previous work.
I. Introduction
Information flow control models can ensure secure database interfaces [1] , ensure secure informat ion flows within an operating system [2] [3] and among distributed operating systems [4] , prevent information leakage during program execution, prevent informat ion leakage within web services [5 ] [6] , and ensure the security of informat ion flowing forward to and backward fro m cascading web services [7 ] [8] . Perhaps preventing informat ion leakage during program execution is the earliest application of informat ion flow control. This paper discusses only the control and excludes others. Therefore, an informat ion flo w control model mentioned in the rest of this paper is a model that prevents information leakage during program execution. To achieve the prevention, an information flow control model monitors statements that will cause informat ion flows and ban statements that may leak informat ion. For examp le, if h igh sensitive information is required to output to a low sensitive device, the output may be non-secure and therefore should be banned (here -sensitive information‖ is the information that should be protected). Information flows may occur when: (a) assigning an expression result to a variable such as -a=b+c;‖, (b) invoking a co mponent and returning fro m an invocation, (c) reading input media such as -scanf(-%d‖, &x);‖, (d) writing output media such as -printf(-%d‖, x);‖, and (e) sending information to another program. Since an informat ion flo w control model prevents information leakage, we have to exp lain the term -information leakage‖. Generally, information leakage occurs when sensitive information managed by a software system is illegally obtained by persons or other software. Our research excludes malicious software such as viruses and worms. Therefore, sensitive information may be leaked only when it is output because persons and non-malicious software can only access output information (note that sending informat ion to other software is a special type of output). According to our survey, most existing models monitor information flows within a system but ignore the flows induced by output statements. Accordingly, our new design especially emphasizes the monitoring of information output.
We involved in the research of informat ion flow control for years and identified that precise control and low runtime overhead are d ifficu lt to achieve simu ltaneously. That is, a comprehensive model can ban every non-secure information flo w but may induce high runtime overhead. On the other hand, a low runtime overhead model may be imprecise. To design a precise and low runtime overhead model, we reexamined the features offered by existing models and extracted a necessary feature set from a d ifferent viewpoint. The extracted features is used to design a new model, which bans the minimu m set of information flows but still ensured no information leakage. After a long time of trial and error, we designed a model using a partial ordered nu mber system. It is named XIFC (X informat ion flo w control) in which the letter -X‖ indicates that the concepts in XIFC deviate fro m existing models. Primary features offered by XIFC are listed below, in wh ich the latter four features are all useful in reducing runtime overhead.
b. XIFC uses simple partial ordered nu mbers instead of co mplicated mechanisms such as decentralized labels and role -based permissions to represent security levels. Checking the validity of information flows using nu mber co mparison is expected to be faster than using the complicated mechanisms.
c. XIFC strict ly monitors every output statement but allo ws most other ones because only output may leak informat ion. To allow most non-output statements, the join operator is applied to ensure no information leakage will occur.
d. XIFC only monitors informat ion flows involving sensitive variables and/or sensitive I/O media. The runtime overhead will be smaller as the number of sensitive information is less.
e. XIFC uses bits to represent security levels. With this, bit operations can be applied to reduce runtime overhead.
Although we just mention five features, XIFC offers more important ones described in section 3.2. According to our survey, most existing models only offer the about mentioned first feature but not the others, especially the third one. In the rest of this paper, we discuss the extraction of features and the design of XIFC. Our experiments show that XIFC bans every non-secure information flo w and reduces runtime overhead substantially when co mparing with our previous work. In the rest of the paper, section II discusses related work, section III describes feature extraction, section IV describes XIFC, section V shows an examp le, section VI proves the correctness of XIFC, section VII gives the evaluation of XIFC, and section VIII is the conclusion.
II. Related Work
Access control matrix (ACM) [9] allows a subject to access an object if the subject possesses the access right. ACM generally achieves static but not dynamic access control [10] [ 11] , such as changing rights using the join operator [12] . DACM (dynamic ACM ) [10] allows dynamically granting access rights under different situations. ACM and its variants such as capability lists are discretionary access control (DAC) [13] .
Mandatory access control (MAC) [14] [15][16] [17] is also useful in access control. The MAC model proposed by Bell&LaPadula [14] categorizes the security levels of objects. Subjects and information flo ws follow the -no read up‖ and -no write down‖ rules [14] . The lattice model [15] [16] is a generalization of Bell&LaPadula's model (see [18] for a survey of lattice models). A lattice is defined as (SC,  ,  ), in wh ich -SC‖ is the set of security classes, - ‖ is the -can flow‖ relationship, and - ‖ is the join operator. The -can flow‖ relationship controls information flo ws and the jo in operator prevent indirect information leakage [12] .
The model in [19] is based on DAC, which controls informat ion flo ws within object-oriented systems. ACLs (access control lists) of objects are used to compute ACLs of executions which are composed of object method(s). Possibly non-secure information flows are filtered out by a message filter. Interactions among executions are categorized into five modes to apply different security policies. Flexib ility is added by allo wing exceptions during or after method execution [20] [21] . More flexibility is added using versions [22] .
The purpose-oriented model [23] [24] [25] proposes that invoking a method may be allowed for some methods but disallowed for others, even when the invokers belong to the same object. Since different methods may be in different security levels [26] , the consideration of purpose orientation is correct.
The approach in [27] proposed a labeling system for UNIX. It attaches a label to every file, device, p ipe, and process. It controls information flows among files, devices, and pipes but not the information flows among program variables. It is thus considered insufficient in controlling information flows within a program.
The decentralized label model [28] [29] [30] attaches labels to variables. The security levels of variables are shown in the labels. A label is co mposed of one or more policies that should be simultaneously obeyed. In general, a policy is co mposed of an owner and zero or more readers that can read the data. Both owners and readers are principals, which may be users, group of users, and so on.
RBAC [31] [37] can also be used in access control. It is co mposed of users, roles, sessions, permissions, role h ierarch ies, user-role assignments (URA), ro le-permission assignments (RPA), and constraints. A role is composed of a set of permissions [33] , which is a consequence of RPA. Roles are structured using the - ‖ relationship. If a relationship -x  y‖ exists, -x‖ possesses all the permissions of -y‖. The - ‖ relationship can thus be used to construct role hierarchies. Roles are assigned to users, which result in URA. Users can establish sessions, within wh ich a user possesses the permissions of the role assigned to him. RBAC has been proved to be a super set of DAC and MAC [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] . Since DA C and MAC are useful in informat ion flo w control [14] [22] , RBAC can also be applied in the control. The model in [38] applies RBA C to control info rmation flo ws in objectoriented systems. It classifies methods and derives a flow graph fro m which non-secure information flows can be identified. We also developed RBA C-based model [39] . It offers a read access rule to prevent informat ion leakage and a write access rule to prevent information corruption. The model in [40] uses read access control lists (RA CL), write access control lists (WACL), permission lists (PERL), and create access lists (CA CL) to determine whether an object method can invoke another one. The rules to determine the valid ity of an invocation are: (a) the object containing the invoking method has permissions to invoke the invoked method and (b) the object containing the invoked method has permission to access the parameters sent to the invoked method.
Flu me [2] is a decentralized information flo w control (DIFC) model for operating systems. It tracks informat ion flows in a system using tags and labels. The control granularity is detailed to processes (i.e., Flu me regards the information input to and output from a process as a whole). The secrecy tags prevent informat ion leakage and the integrity tags prevent informat ion corruption. The two types of controls are similar to the read and write control in our d iscussion. Flu me also avoids informat ion leaked to untrusted channel (e.g., sockets). The function of Laminar [3] is similar to that of Flu me. Nevertheless, the control granularity is detailed to data structures (e.g., arrays) and system resources (e.g., sockets). Both Flume and Laminar are used in operating systems. Since our research focuses on embedding an information flow control model within a program to prevent information leakage, other models including Flu me and Laminar are excluded in this paper.
III. Feature Extraction
In this section, we list the features offered by existing models and extract a set of necessary ones from our viewpoint to design XIFC. g. Use of ACLs. ACLs are applied to control object access. This is the kernel feature offered by the model in [19] .
Important Features Offered by Existing Models
h. Join operation. After a variable var receives the informat ion derived fro m a set of variables, the join operation is applied to ad just the security level of var. The operation prevents both direct and indirect informat ion leakage. It is an important feature offered by almost every existing model.
i. Dynamically changing security levels of variables.
The security levels of variables may be changed according to assignments. Most existing models allow the change using operators such as join.
j. Declassification. If a low sensitive variable possesses a high security level, the security level should be declassified. For examp le, the case history of a patient is sensitive and should be protected. However, the statistic information of ten thousands patients' case histories becomes non-sensitive because extract ing the case history of a specific patient fro m the information is impossible. In this case, the security level of the statistic information should be declassified (the security level of the statistic information will be h igh because of the jo in operations).
k. Granularity of control. Control granularity of different models may be different. For examp le, the control granularity of the model in [19] , that in [23] [24] [25] [38] [40] , and that in [39] are respectively detailed to objects, methods, and variables. l. Applicable systems. So me models are designed for object-oriented systems [19] [39] [40] , some are for nonobject-oriented systems [41] , and some are for both types of systems [15] [16] [30] .
m. Static analysis. The model in [38] statically constructs a method invocation graph and identifies non-secure information flows from the graph.
n. Purpose-oriented invocation. The model in [23] [24] [25] proposes that invoking a method may be allowed for some methods but disallowed for others according to different purposes. o. Role relationship management. Our previous work [42] proposed that different role relationships may result in different permissions. For example, the discount rate given to a customer may be different for different relationships (e.g., strangers, friends, and family members will receive different d iscount rates). [2 ] [3 ]). Our previous work [39] proposed that a variable can only receive the information fro m trusted data sources. This control prevents information corruption.
q. Controlling every variable. If the control granularity of a model is detailed to variables, the model may control the information flows of every variable.
r. Banning every non-secure information flow. Existing models generally ban every non-secure informat ion flow, except one of our previous work (see below).
s. Allowing non-secure but harmless information flows; banning secure but harmful ones. Since information may be leaked only when it is output, our previous work allo ws non-output information flows to execute until output occurs [43] . The security of the output will then be checked.
t. Separation-of-duty (SoD). Th is is an important
constraint of RBAC. It is naturally that an RBA Cbased model offers this feature.
u. Controlling inter-program information flows. So me models control the informat ion exchanged among different organizations [17] [44] . This control is similar to controlling inter-program information flows.
Extracting Necessary Features
A set of simple but necessary features are extracted according to our viewpoint. Perhaps others may extract other sets according to their viewpoints. We do not argue which viewpoint is better. We only hope to use the extracted features to design a precise and low runtime overhead model. The extracted features are listed below.
a. The control granularity is detailed to variables. We need this granularity of control because different variables carry informat ion with different sensitivities. We use an example to exp lain this. Suppose a doctor can read and change the case history of a patient assigned to him, and can read but not change the case histories of others. Also suppose the patient pt1 is assigned to the doctor dc2 but not dc1. This imp lies that dc1 can read the case history of pt1 by invoking method(s) of pt1, and dc2 can read and change the case history of pt1 by invoking other method(s) of pt1. If the control granularity is detailed to objects, access rights are defined among objects. With this, both dc1 and dc2 can invoke every method of pt1, which incorrectly allo ws dc1 to change the case history of pt1. If the control granularity is detailed to methods and dc1 can invoke the method pt1.md1 to read the case history of pt1. If a statement that changes the case history incorrectly appears in pt1.md1, the case history of pt1 will be changed by the unauthorized doctor dc1 when dc1 invokes pt1.md1. e. The declassification operation is applied. As described in the examp le of section 3.1, this feature is important and necessary.
f. Role concept is not applied inside a program but applied outside it.
An executing program is an informat ion exchange center. As long as no informat ion is output, no information leakage will occur. Therefore, ro le concepts need not be embed in a program. However, information will be output eventually and the informat ion may be captured by unauthorized ro les (played by users or other software). Therefore, ro le concept should be applied outside a program. Since a program cannot control informat ion outside it, the role concept is actually managed by the operating system. This implies that the information flow control model should cooperate with the operating system. The cooperation occurs on the I/O media (devices or files). That is, both I/O med ia and roles should possess security levels. When a role intends to access the information of an I/O media, the operating system should check the security levels to ensure the security of access. We do not mention read/write access control, except informat ion output, because only output may leak informat ion. We use an assignment to explain our consideration because assignment can be regarded as both read and write. For example, the assignment -a=b+c;‖ can be regarded that a read the information obtained from -b+c‖. It can also be regarded that the informat ion obtained fro m -b+c‖ is written to a. Suppose variables in the assignment are in the same group (otherwise the statement cannot be executed) and the init ial security level numbers of a, b, and c are respectively 1, 2, and 3. Since the security level of the variable a is the lo west, existing models will ban the statement. Ho wever, as the jo in operation will change the security level nu mber o f a to be 3 after the assignment, the assignment will not cause information leakage. This exp lains why we do not control read access. To explain write access, we suppose the initial security numbers of a, b, and c are respectively 4, 2, and 3. Since the security level of variable a is the highest this time, existing model allows the assignment. However, we think that the data sources of b and c should be trusted by a to prevent information corruption (this is -write access control‖ [39] ). In our new design, we use groups to control write access. That is, if the informat ion obtained fro m -b +c‖ cannot be written to a, we place the variables in different groups.
The doctor/patient examp le mentioned near the beginning of section 3.2 reveals the necessity of differentiating whether an assignment is a read or a write sometimes. Therefore, a variable should be associated with a read group and a write group. In the doctor/patient examp le, suppose the patient pt1 is not assigned to the doctor dc1. Then, the assignment -dc1.pt1CaseHistory = pt1.caseHistory;‖ can be executed but not -pt1.caseHistory = dc1.pt1CaseHistory;‖ (dc1 reads pt1's case history in the former statement and write it in the latter one). To achieve this control, the variables pt1.caseHistory and dc1.pt1CaseHistory should be in the same read group but in the different write groups. Moreover, a mechanis m indicating that the former assignment is a read and the latter a write should be available.
The spirit of the features -use of labels‖, -RBACembedding‖, -role embedding‖, and -use of AC Ls‖ is similar. They assign permissions to roles (or principal). Our model [39] showed that using permissions induces large runtime overhead. We thus ignore permissions/roles inside a program but use partial ordered numbers to represent security levels of variables. However, the fact that users play roles cannot be vetoed in a software system. We thus incorporate the role concept outside the software. That is, the operating system should manage users and roles.
The feature -dynamically change security levels of variables‖ is achieved by the join operation. As to the feature -applicable systems‖, we think that object orientation or other paradig ms will not affect the function of a program. Therefore, an informat ion flow control model should be applicable to software of every paradigm. The feature -static analysis‖ is difficult to achieve because security levels will be changed dynamically.
The features -purpose-oriented invocation‖ can be achieved easily when the control granularity is detailed to variables. For examp le, suppose the method -a. 
IV. XIFC
This section defines XIFC and describes the use of the model.
Definitions
XIFC uses a partial ordered number system to control informat ion flows. A part ial ordered number in XIFC is called a security level (SL), which depicts the sensitivities of variables and I/O media (devices and files). A SL is defined below. d. SLV is the security level nu mber. Larger number corresponds to more sensitive information.
Some may think that
In most cases, XIFC uses a bit to represent a group number. For example, suppose a 32 bit word is used to represent a group. Then, the group 10010…100 indicates that the group numbers constitute the set {2, 28, 31}. If a bit represent a group number, checking whether variables are co mparable can be achieved using bit ANDs (a non-zero AND result means group comparable). Ho wever, using bits to represent group numbers may cause trouble in some systems. For example, the case histories of different patients should be in different groups because a patient's case history can only be accessed by the patient himself. In th is case, numbers instead of bits should be used for groups. In addition to groups, XIFC also uses bits to represent SLVs in which only one bit in a SLV is 1. For examp le, the SLVs 1000…00 and 000…001 in a 32 bit word are respectively 31 and 0. When using bits to represent a SLV, the largest SLV in a variable set can be identified using bit ORs fo llo wed by assembly instructions to extract the most significant bit from the bit OR result.
SLs control information flows with in a program. If informat ion should be sent to other programs, the informat ion should be associated with a set of valid destinations (VD). A VD contains the programs that can receive the information, as defined below. SLs and VDs are associated with sensitive variab les. According to Definition 2, a VD is a set, which means that more than one program may be allowed to receive the information of a variable. As to non-sensitive variables, they have no SLs and VDs. When checking SLs and VDs, non-sensitive variables are bypassed. After defining SL and VD, XIFC is defined below. e. JOIN is the join operator. It will be described in more details later.
Definiti on 3. XIFC = (SVAR, SIO, SLS, VDS, JOIN
f. DECL is the declassification operator.
g. CTLM is the informat ion flo w control mechanisms embedded in a program. XIFC use directives for the control.
Using XIFC
We use the five types of statements that will result in informat ion flo ws mentioned near the beginning of section 1 to describe the use of XIFC.
a. Assignment statements
To control in formation flo ws, only statements that may cause informat ion leakage or corruption should be monitored. Since only output statements may cause leakage, the monitoring of assignments focuses on preventing information corruption. The prevention can be achieved by checking whether variables are comparable (i.e., checking whether variables are within the same group).
For an assignment without sensitive variables, the statement can be executed and XIFC does nothing. If a sensitive variab le var is assigned a value derived fro m non-sensitive ones, the assignment is allo wed. After that, var becomes non-sensitive. During an invocation, the arguments of an invoking component (e.g., a C function) are assigned to the parameters of an invoked one. The informat ion flows induced by an invocation are thus similar to an assignment not categorized as a read or a write. Accordingly, the management for an assignment and the join operation set J3 can be applied for an invocation. As to returning fro m an invocation, the return informat ion is assigned to a variable. This is again similar to an assignment. It can thus be handled similar to an invocation.
c. Statements that read information from input media
A read operation will not output information. Therefore, only read groups should be checked for variable co mparab ility. If the checking passes, the read operation is allowed. A read operation may ob tain informat ion fro m input devices or files. Manipulating the two types of read operations is similar. If the variable var intends to read information fro m an input med ia ime (ime may be an input device or a file), the read operation is decided as follows .
c.1 If both var and ime are non-sensitive, the read operation is allowed and XIFC does nothing.
c.2 If var is sensitive but ime is non-sensitive, the read operation is allowed. After that, var becomes nonsensitive.
c.3 If var is non-sensitive but ime is sensitive, the read operation is allowed.
c. 4 If both var and ime are sensitive, the read operation is allo wed if the intersection of their read group is not empty.
After reading an input device, the join operator performs the operations below (Gw var and VD var are unchanged because an input device has no Gw and VD). associated with a SL. If the informat ion inf is required to output to the media (devices or files) odev, the output operation is decided as follows.
Only informat ion output may cause leakage. Therefore, XIFC controls output strictly. To achieve the control, every sensitive output device and file is associated with a SL. If the informat ion inf is required to output to the media (devices or files) odev, the output operation is decided as follows. 
When outputting informat ion to a file, the SL and VD of the informat ion should also be output to protect the informat ion. No join operations are needed after the output because the SL of an output media cannot be changed.
e. Statements that send information to another program
If program prg1 intends to send information to prg2, prg2 should be embedded with XIFC. Sending nonsensitive information is allowed and XIFC does nothing. To send the sensitive information inf to prg2, the IP address and port number pair of prg2 should be within the VD of inf. When prg1 sends inf to prg2, the SL and VD of inf are also sent. The parameter receiv ing inf should be associated with the SL and VD to protect inf in prg2.
The SLs, VDs, and join operations of XIFC ensure that sensitive info rmation managed by a program will not be leaked. However, XIFC cannot control the informat ion after it is output. In this case, the operating system should cooperate with XIFC to prevent informat ion leakage. We propose a possible cooperation approach as described below.
For the information output to devices such as screens and printers, the operating system cannot control its access because it cannot control their locations. Accordingly, system managers should control the locations of sensitive output devices. In general, the location placing a sensitive output device should be comparable with the SLV of the device. That is, a device with a high S LV should be placed in a location in wh ich only high security level persons can be there. Moreover, the location of a sensitive device should better not change during program execution because the SLV of an output device is fixed during program execution. When a program is not under execution, device locations can be changed. However, the new location should still be comparable with the SLV of the device. If an output device is migrated to a higher (lo wer) sensitive location, its SLV of the device in the program should be increased (decreased) accordingly. This will cause re-comp iling of the program.
For the informat ion output to files, the operating system can control its access. To cooperate with XIFC, the operating system should offer a file access interface operated as follows. First, every role appears in the system should be associated with a SL similar to that in XIFC. Second, when a role intends to access a file, the operating system co mpares the SLs of the information stored in the file with the ro le's SL. The operating system then retrieves the information accessible by the role fro m the file. We use the doctor/patient example to explain the necessity of the file access interface. Suppose the case histories of all patients are stored in a file and a patient can access his own case history only. In this case, if a patient intends to access the case history file, the file access interface will retrieve only the patient's case history.
V. Example
We use partial function of a hospital's patient management system as an examp le to depict the used of XIFC. The function is described below.
In a hospital, the case histories of patients are stored in a file. A doctor can read and change the case history of a patient assigned to him, and can read but not change the case histories of others.
Since a rea l hospital supports thousands of patients and each patient should be in an independent group, numbers should be used to represent groups. To depict the use of bits, this examp le assumes only two doctors dc0 and dc1 who support six patients pt0 through pt5. We also assume that: (a) pt0 through pt2 is assigned to dc0 and the others to dc1 and (b) the patients' case histories are stored in the file CaseHt. We use an eight bit byte to represent groups. We also use an eight bit byte to represent SLV. The follo wing exh ibit ion uses PDL (program design language) to depict the use of XIFC in which a statement started with two asterisks is a XIFC d irective. To depict the control of I/O media, we add a file Cast Ht_operator, a keyboard Kb_dc0 for dc0, a screen Scrn_dc0 for dc0, and a screen Scrn_operator. 
VI. Proof of Correctness
The primary mission of an informat ion flow control model is preventing information leakage and corruption. To prove in formation co rruption will not occur is difficult because even a data source trusted by a variable may incidentally corrupt the variab le. In XIFC, variables in the same write group are considered mutually trusted and write operations can occur among the variables. Although we cannot ensure XIFC prevents every corruption, we can at least say that malicious corruption will not occur. Fo r examp le, sending a customer's member nu mber to a variable storing his salary will corrupt the variable. XIFC will ban this corruption because the variable s toring a customer's member nu mber and that storing his salary are in different write groups. To prove XIFC prevents informat ion leakage, we need the following assumptions:
a. The cooperation among XIFC, the system managers, and the operating system function correctly (see the description near the end of section 4.2). Otherwise, either the system managers or the operating system may leak information. d. None of the above cases will happen to a program reading informat ion fro m a file output by another one (here we suppose XIFC is embedded in the programs).
Case d is necessary because informat ion output to a file may be read and leaked by other programs. In case a, var will not be output to group incomparable devices or files because group comparison will be performed before the output. As to dev var , the intersections on groups in the join operation sets J1 through J3 ensure that -Grw devvar  Grw var ‖, -Gr devvar  Gr var ‖, and -Gw devvar  Gw var ‖. Therefore, no dev var will be output to devices or files whose groups are incomparab le with those of var.
In case b, var will not be output to devices or files with a s maller SLV because SLV comparison will be performed before the output. As to dev var , the MAX function in the jo in operation sets J1 through J3 ens ures that -SLV devvar  SLV var ‖. Therefore, no dev var will be output to devices or files with SLVs smaller than SLV var .
In case c, var will not be sent to programs not allo wed to receive var because of VD checking before the sending (see item e of section 4.2). As to dev var , the intersections on VDs in the join operation sets J1 through J3 ensure that -VD devvar  VD var ‖. Therefore, dev var will not be sent to programs not allo wed to receive var.
In case d, the join operation set J5 ensures that the variable var reading the informat ion inf stored in a file will be associated with the SL and VD of inf. Cases a through c above ensure that var will not leak inf. #
VII. Evaluati on
We embedded XIFC in C language and implemented a prototype. The prototype is a preprocessor, which changes XIFC d irect ives into C definit ions or statements and stores SLs and VDs. It also adds code to: (a) manage the directives XSL and DECLASSIFY, (b) check the security of informat ion flows and, (c) do jo in operations. The runtime overhead of XIFC deviates substantially according to different systems. For example, if a system manages few sensitive variables and bits can represent groups, the runtime overhead should be low because bit operations can be applied. As another examp le, if a system manages a large nu mber of sensitive variables and numbers should be used to represent groups, the runtime overhead should be high because bit operations cannot apply. Although we still use assembly procedures, the procedures are mo re time consuming than bit operations. We used the following systems in the experiments to check the runtime overheads of XIFC.
a. An advertising system in which only the real prices are sensitive. In this system, b its can represent groups.
b. A depositing/withdrawing system of a bank. In this system, most information is sensitive. However, since customers cannot access the files storing their informat ion, customer informat ion can be c. An order management system. In the system, we suppose only the credit card information and the order histories of customers are sensitive. We also suppose that a customer can access his own order history storing in a file. Since the number of customers is generally large and different customers should belong to different groups, numbers should be used to represent groups.
d. A system managing the case histories of patients. In this system, nu mbers should be used to represent groups. Moreover, most variables are sensitive.
Before evaluating runtime overhead, we first obtained the detection percentage of invalid statements (i.e., statements that may leak informat ion). We required students to inject invalid statements into programs embedding XIFC. The experiments showed that every injected invalid statement was detected. After that, we required students to implement: (a) the about mentioned four systems embedding XIFC and (b) the same systems not embedding XIFC. We then collected the following information: (a) the percentage of sensitive variables during runtime, (b) the runtime of the systems embedding XIFC, and (c) the runtime of the systems not embedding XIFC. Since sensitive variables may become non-sensitive and vice versa according to joins and the XSL and DECLASSIFY direct ives, the percentage of sensitive variables is not fixed during runtime. The averaged percentages of sensitive variables for the four systems are respectively between: (a) 5% and 8%, (b ) 91% and 95%, (c) 35% and 40%, and (d) 88% and 93%. To identify the runtime overheads of the systems, the systems embedding and those not embedding XIFC were executed and their runtimes were co mpared. The experiment result is depicted in Fig. 1 . In the figure, a system with a runtime overhead k corresponds that the runtime of the system embedding XIFC is k+1 times the runtime of that without the embedding. Fig. 1 shows that the runtime overhead of system d is about 1.5, which is much smaller than those of the models we developed before. The runtime overheads for systems a, b, and c are about 0.08, 0.78, and 0.8 respectively. These overheads are attractive, which implies that the features offered by XIFC are useful. The runtime overheads of the four system deviate substantially because of the factors: (a) the percentage of sensitive variables and (b) the representation of groups (i.e., using bits or numbers).
VIII. Conclusion
Information flow control models can ensure secure database interfaces, ensure secure informat ion flows within an operating system and among distributed operating systems, prevent informat ion leakage during program execution, prevent information leakage in web services, and ensure the security of informat ion flowing forward to and backward fro m cascading web services. This paper discusses the models that prevent informat ion leakage during program execut ion and excludes others.
Existing informat ion flo w control models offer more or less features. Since only in formation output may cause leakage, controlling output statements is an important feature. However, our survey reveals that existing models generally ignore this feature. We thus emphasize the importance of the control in this paper. In addition, we also intend to design a precise and low runtime overhead model. To ach ieve this, we reexamined the features offered by existing models and extracted a set of simp le and necessary features to design a new model XIFC (X information flow control). With the assistance of join operations, XIFC only strictly controls output statements and allows most other ones. This reduces runtime overhead. To further reduce the overhead, XIFC only controls information flows involving sensitive variables and/or I/O media. Moreover, XIFC uses bits to represent the security levels of sensitive in formation and uses assembly procedures to monitor information flows. Our experiments show that XIFC bans every non-secure informat ion flo ws and the runtime overhead is substantially reduced when comparing with our previous work.
